Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI. by Vickers,  Peter
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
14 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Vickers, Peter (2016) 'Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI.', Synthese. .
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1082-4
Publisher's copyright statement:
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1082-4
S.I . : NEW THINKING ABOUT SCIENTIFIC REALISM
Understanding the selective realist defence against
the PMI
Peter Vickers1
Received: 20 July 2015 / Accepted: 23 March 2016
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Oneof the popular realist responses to the pessimisticmeta-induction (PMI)
is the ‘selective’ move, where a realist only commits to the ‘working posits’ of a suc-
cessful theory, and withholds commitment to ‘idle posits’. Antirealists often criticise
selective realists for not being able to articulate exactly what is meant by ‘working’
and/or not being able to identify the working posits except in hindsight. This paper
aims to establish two results: (i) sometimes a proposition is, in an important sense,
‘doing work’, and yet does not warrant realist commitment, and (ii) the realist will
be able to respond to PMI-style historical challenges if she can merely show that cer-
tain selected posits do not require realist commitment (ignoring the question of which
posits do). These two results act to significantly adjust the dialectic vis-à-vis PMI-style
challenges to selective realism.
1 Introduction
The so-called ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ (PMI) challenge to scientific realism has
never really gone away since it was vividly articulated by Laudan (1981). Since 1981
the details have changed, but the overall spirit remains the same. Simply put, the history
of science still does pose a problem for scientific realists who want to make some sort
of inference from the explanatory and/or predictive success of scientific theories to the
approximate truth1 of scientific theories, or theory parts. And it even poses a problem
for the ‘selective’ realists, who make a distinction between the ‘working’ parts of a
1 I follow the convention of using ‘approximate truth’ as shorthand for ‘approximate truth or truth’.
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theory, which are said to warrant realist commitment, and the ‘idle’ parts of a theory.2
Selective realism was actually designed specifically to overcome the PMI. But there
remain historical examples where what very much seem to be working posits—in
the derivation of a successful novel prediction, say—are definitely not approximately
true (whatever your theory of ‘approximate truth’). In fact, some of the examples
on Laudan’s original list are still relevant here (caloric, phlogiston, the luminiferous
ether). But a number of new examples have recently been introduced to the literature,
put forward specifically as challenges to selective realism, including: (i) Kirchhoff’s
theory of diffraction (Saatsi and Vickers 2011), (ii) Sommerfeld’s prediction of the
hydrogen fine structure (Vickers 2012), (iii) Dirac’s prediction of the positron (Pashby
2012), and (iv) Ptolemaic astronomy (Díez and Carman 2015). Vickers (2013) and
Lyons (2016) list a number of other possible examples.
In recent years much of the discussion has concerned how (and whether) the selec-
tive realist can define ‘working’, such that (a) the definition is properly motivated (not
ad hoc), and (b) the realist can use the definition to rebut the historical challenges.3
The thought, usually, is that the realist has to be able to define ‘working’, otherwise
the position is empty since the realist can’t tell us what we should be epistemically
committed to. For example, Stanford (2006, pp.173–180; 2009, pp.385–387) has com-
plained that if the realist can only identify the working posits in hindsight (that is, after
we already have a successor theory in hand), then realism is bankrupt, since the whole
point was to tell us which parts of current science we should/shouldn’t put our epis-
temic trust in. However, in much of this literature two distinct realist projects have
been conflated: (i) the project of responding to the historical challenge, and (ii) the
project of explaining what realists should commit to. These projects are not entirely
separate, of course, but one must bear in mind that they are definitely not one and the
same project. Here—as elsewhere in philosophy—a defence against a challenge (in
this case the historical challenge to realism) is not necessarily a positive argument for
the view, nor does it have to be.
In this paper I explain what the realist really has to do to respond to contempo-
rary PMI-style objections, emphasising what the realist does not have to do. This is
articulated as a defensive strategy for the selective realist in Sect. 2. Section 3 then
considers a possible ‘disjunction problem’ which arises in this context. In Sect. 4 I
consider the possibility that, even if we can’t prospectively identify what warrants
realist commitment in our best contemporary theories, we can prospectively iden-
tify at least some elements which do not merit realist commitment. In this way it
may be possible to make a prediction concerning what will not be retained in future
science.
2 The ‘working/idle’ terminology is now common, and I will adopt it here in a broad sense to refer towhat is
common to several different contemporary ‘selective’ realisms. These include Kitcher’s distinction between
‘working posits’ and ‘presuppositional posits’ (1993), Psillos’s ‘divide et impera’ distinction between ‘idle’
and ‘essentially contributing constituents’ (1999), Saatsi’s focus on ‘success-fuelling properties’ (2005), and
Chakravartty’s ‘semirealism’ distinction between ‘detection properties’ and ‘auxiliary properties’ (2007).
What these all share is the idea that only certain parts/aspects of a scientific theory are confirmed by the
theory’s successes, and thus merit realist commitment.
3 See Peters (2014) for discussion and references.
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2 The selective defence against the PMI
This paper will consider one particularly powerful PMI-style objection to scientific
realism, consisting in the claim that there are several examples in the history of science
of theories which achieved very significant (predictive) success, but where the work-
ing posits are not (all) approximately true. In other words (so the claim goes) there
are examples in the history of science of derivations of novel predictions, where at
least some of the hypotheses which feature in/fuelled the derivation are definitely not
approximately true (on any reasonable definition of ‘approximate truth’). The targets of
this challenge are most contemporary scientific realists, including those that advocate
a selective realist commitment. Even one such example from the history of science can
be a real thorn in the side formost realists, who typically think that novel predictive suc-
cess is a very good indication that the theory’s working posits are approximately true.
But if there are several examples (and there seem to be) then this argument also speaks
against more cautious realists, who claim that novel predictive success is quite a good
indication, or probablymeans that the theory’s working posits are approximately true.
Let’s think about how the dialectic works here in a little more detail. Since the
antirealist is putting forward a challenge to the realist, there is a significant burden on
the antirealist to demonstrate the force of the objection. The antirealist needs to present
a case from the history of science, identifying a successwhich is sufficiently impressive
for realist commitment—let’s assume a novel predictive success. Then the antirealist
needs to reconstruct the derivation of that prediction, identifying assumptions which
(at least apparently) merit realist commitment, given their role in the derivation. And
then finally the antirealist needs to show that at least one of those assumptions is not
approximately true when compared with current scientific thinking. Now this is a lot
to achieve, and so the realist has plenty of options for responses. The main options for
the realist are as follows:
(i) Question whether the success identified is really success enough for realist com-
mitment.4
(ii) Question whether the reconstruction of the derivation is fair to the history, or
whether it is somehow biased, or just one possible reconstruction.5
(iii) Question whether the specific ‘working posits’ identified by the antirealist as
not approximately true (a) really do merit realist commitment, and (b) really are
not-even-approximately-true in light of current scientific thinking.
It should be noted, of course, that these aren’t just options for the realist when respond-
ing to an antirealist objection. They are also criteria the realist herself must consider
very carefullywhen she opts tomake a realist commitment to certain scientific assump-
tions, and they canwork against her just asmuch as they canwork for her. For example,
when considering these criteria it may turn out that some part of science the realist
intuitively really wanted to believe, or originally took for granted as ‘getting at the
truth’ in fact turns out to be something the realist should not believe given her own
4 Scientific success comes in degrees, even ‘novel predictive’ success. See e.g. Fahrbach (2011).
5 Cf. Schickore (2006) here, who argues that all reconstruction ‘requires a perspective’; there is no such
thing as the one, true reconstruction. However, see Kinzel (2015) for a response to Schickore.
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realist position. So the criteria are very important vis-à-vis responding to antirealist
threats, but they can also force realists to withdraw realist commitment from parts of
science they really want to commit to (e.g. because, intuitively, there seems to be ‘lots
of evidence’ for the scientific claims in question).
The focus of this paper is going to be criterion (iiia), questioningwhether the specific
assumptions identified by the antirealist really do merit realist commitment. It is here
that much of the literature on this topic (including Psillos 1999; Lyons 2006; Vickers
2012, and Harker 2013) has conflated the realist’s defence against the PMI and the
positive project of the realist to identify what the realist should be committed to in a
given case. Now, one way one might respond to an antirealist challenge is to invoke
some theory of ‘working posits’—identifying which assumptions really are ‘working’
in the case in question—and then conclude that the posits identified by the antirealist
are not included within the working posits. One of the most influential figures in
the selective realist community is Stathis Psillos (e.g. Psillos 1999) and he is very
easily interpreted as doing just this. Lyons (2006) introduces Psillos’s divide et impera
realism as a response to ‘the historical challenge’, shows that there are problems with
Psillos’s definition of ‘the posits which really fuel the derivation’ (which merit realist
commitment according to Psillos), and concludes (p.537) that “this sophisticated form
of realism remains threatened by the historical argument that prompted it.” Harker
(2013)—partly drawing on Lyons (2006)—similarly fuses together both the realist’s
defence against PMI-style objections and the positive project of the realist. This leads
him to state the following of the selective realist strategy:
For the strategy to answer Laudan-style concerns […] the criteria we invoke
to isolate those constituents of theories that are to be recommended for real-
ist endorsement must render such constituents epistemically accessible (Harker
2013, Sect. 2).
This entails that to answer the historical challenge we need to have a convincing
theory concerning how it is possible to identify the posits which warrant realist com-
mitment. But this is incorrect. To answer the historical challenge the realist can do
this, and prominent realists such as Psillos have done this, but the realist need not
do this. Indeed, to develop a theory of which posits warrant realist commitment is to
make the realist’s task much harder than it has to be if all she wishes to do (for now)
is respond to ‘Laudan-style concerns’.
To respond, all the realist needs to do is show that the specific assumptions identified
by the antirealist do notmerit realist commitment. And she can do this without saying
anything about how to identify the posits which do merit realist commitment. How
is that possible? There is more than one answer here. The simplest case is when an
assumption can just be eliminated without affecting the derivation in question. In
this case the assumption is clearly idle vis-à-vis the success, and thus doesn’t merit
realist commitment. And this can be established without any real theory of what does
merit realist commitment, simply by eliminating the posit in question and displaying
the resultant derivation. However, such a case is going to be vanishingly rare. If an
assumption is so obviously idle, then (a) scientists would usually have left it out in the
first place, and (b) antirealists looking for a serious threat to selective realism would
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surely recognise that the assumption in question is not doing any work, such that the
selective realist has an easy response to the challenge.
Muchmore serious is a casewhere a scientist has indeedused a posit in the derivation
of a novel prediction, and that posit cannot be simply eliminated from the derivation
without also eliminating the success. This means that there is a straight forward sense
in which the assumption is doing work: the derivation doesn’t go through without it.
But at the same time the posit in question does notmerit realist commitment, because
it is not confirmed by the success. The reason is this: the posit in question is doing
work in the derivation solely in virtue of the fact that it entails some other proposition,
which itself is sufficient (when combined with the other assumptions in play) for that
specific derivational step. In such a case it is this other proposition, loosely speaking
‘contained within’ the original proposition, which is (seems to be) really fuelling that
particular step in the derivation. The bracketed ‘seems to be’ signals the fact that, again,
the realist doesn’t need to identify what really deserves realist commitment here. If
all the realist wants to do, for now, is respond to the antirealist challenge, then all that
matters is that the original proposition does not merit realist commitment. And this is
the case even though there is an important sense in which it is not completely idle.6
We can bring this sort of case to life with some examples, first a couple of toy exam-
ples and then a real case from the history of science. Consider first a situation where a
doctor supposes you have the adenovirus (e.g. because the adenovirus is known to be
widespread in the neighbourhood). That doctor might well use this assumption along
with other assumptions about the human immune system to quite accurately predict
howyour symptomswill develop. But the doctormight bewrong about your having the
adenovirus, and in addition the doctor’s assumption is doing work in the sense that she
reaches her conclusionmaking use of that assumption. Is this a case of miraculous suc-
cess, then, since the doctor predicted correctlywhilstmaking use of a false assumption?
Of course not: it’s easy to make sense of how the doctor predicted correctly despite
hermistake. The truth is you do have one of the cold viruses.And the doctor’s reasoning
only depended on her (implicit) belief that you have one of the cold viruses, a belief
she is committed to in virtue of the fact that she believes that you have the adenovirus.
Thus her false belief is doing work in her reasoning solely in virtue of the fact that
it entails some other proposition, which itself is sufficient (when combined with the
other assumptions in play) for the success. Another way to put it is this: the doctor
was committed to what mattered here; she was mistaken only about redundant details,
details which go beyond what was needed to make her prediction.
This particular way of identifying a proposition as not meriting realist commitment
has been touched on in the literature, but it is not widely appreciated. For example,
Saatsi (2005, p. 532) discusses a case concerning a crammed elevator which refuses
to move. Saatsi is interested in explanations which contain false content which is
‘surplus’ in the sense that it is non-explanatory. But the case is also useful when
6 In previous work (e.g. Vickers 2013) I have tended to describe the original proposition as ‘idle’ in such a
case. I now believe that to define ‘idle’ in the necessary way one is going sufficiently against many intuitions
that confusion is bound to result. Better to stick with definitions which are closer to common intuitions, and
describe the original proposition as ‘doing work’. Thus the working/idle distinction no longer maps onto
the merits/doesn’t merit realist commitment distinction.
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trying to understand realist commitments in a case of predictive success. Suppose
somebody predicts that an elevator will refuse to move by reasoning with the false
assumption that the elevator load is 50 kg too heavy. One predicts successfully, since
the reasoning depends only on the assumption that the load is too heavy—the belief
that it is specifically 50 kg too heavy is redundant detail. Or to put it another way, the
‘50 kg too heavy’ assumption does work in the derivation only in virtue of the fact
that it entails another ‘too heavy’ assumption which itself is sufficient, when combined
with the other assumptions in play, to reach the true prediction.
Many in the community still assume that if an assumption is used in a derivation then
the realist must make a commitment to it (must believe it to be approximately true).
Lyons (2006) even describes the selective realist strategy as ‘deployment realism’ (fol-
lowing Kitcher 1993), terminology which strongly suggests that the ‘deployed’ (used)
assumptions are the assumptions the realist must commit to. But this is not the case: the
given toy examples show very clearly that, at least sometimes, realists should notmake
a realist commitment to all the assumptions employed within a derivation of a success-
ful prediction. After all, it would be madness for anyone to believe the lift to be exactly
50 kg too heavy just because that assumption was used to reach a correct prediction.
We can illuminate the strategy further with a real case from the history of science.
Take Bohr’s prediction of the frequencies of the spectral lines of ionised helium.
Vickers (2012) puts this forward as a possible counterexample to selective realism. It
seems to fit the bill, since:
(a) The prediction of the frequencies of the spectral lines of ionised helium was a
novel predictive success, and was seen as extremely significant at the time.
(b) Bohr’s prediction came about by making direct use of his theory of the atom
(which includes some assumptions which are definitely not approximately true).
However, Vickers (2012) presents a ‘way out’ for the selective scientific realist, by
noting that one of the assumptions Bohr made, and used to reach his successful pre-
dictions, does not merit realist commitment. The assumption in question is as follows:
H: The electron orbits the nucleus at specific, quantised energies, corresponding
to only certain ‘allowed’ orbital trajectories.
This doesn’t merit realist commitment, since it can be seen to do work within the
relevant derivation solely in virtue of the fact that it entails another proposition, which
itself is sufficient for the relevant step of the derivation. This other proposition is the
following:
H∗: The electron can only occupy certain, specific, quantised energy stateswithin
the atom.
Bohrwas committed toH∗ in virtue of his being committed toH. But it turns out that
H∗ is sufficient for Bohr’s derivation to go through.7 And, crucially for the selective
7 Cf. Norton (2000, pp. 86–87): “The reduced form [of the derivation] eschews all talk of elliptical orbits
other than in the domain of correspondence with classical theory… No assumption is made or needed that
these stationary states are elliptical orbits of some definite size and frequency of localised electrons. What
is retained is that these states possess a definite energy.” See also Vickers (2012).
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realist, whilst H is certainly false (there are no ‘trajectories’), H∗ is approximately true
(by the lights of current scientific thought).
This is enough to answer the antirealist’s concern that one of the working posits
was not approximately true. The realist might well accept that H is not approximately
true, given the reference to orbital trajectories. The realist might also accept that H is
‘doing work’ within Bohr’s derivation, in the sense that it certainly cannot be simply
eliminated from the derivation without destroying the derivation, and thus the success.
However, H does not merit realist commitment, given its relation to the success in
question. There is an important sense in which it is not directly fuelling that success;
rather it is only indirectly fuelling that success in the sense that it does so via its relation
to H∗. If anything merits realist commitment here, it is H∗, and not H.
The crucial step now is to note that the realist does not need to claim that H∗ merits
realist commitment. All that matters to answering the challenge is to show that H does
notmerit realist commitment (at least, not in virtue of its relation to Bohr’s prediction
of the ionised helium spectral lines). Vickers (2012) actually muddies the waters here:
he makes a distinction between (i) the assumptions Bohr used to reach his predictions,
and (ii) the assumptions which were ‘truly necessary’ to generate the predictions (p.
10). But the words ‘truly necessary’ are a mistake—they belong in a discussion of
what the realist should be committed to, not in a discussion of what the realist should
not be committed to. And to answer the challenge the realist just doesn’t need to claim
that H∗ is ‘truly necessary’ for the derivation. Perhaps the derivation can go through
with an assumption still weaker, such that it turns out that H∗ is also immune to realist
commitment. Perhaps only very abstract ‘structure’ truly merits realist commitment,
as structural realists like to claim. But that can be left for another day. We are not
here in the business of identifying realist commitments; we are in the business of
showing that some specific assumption does not merit realist commitment. Because
that is enough to answer the historical challenge.
3 A disjunction problem?
The toy examples above serve an important role in this paper. They serve to show by
example just how ridiculous it would be to suggest that an assumption merits doxastic
commitment, on ‘no miracles’ grounds, just because it was used to reach a successful
prediction. A full answer to the question ‘Why exactly is it ridiculous?’ is harder to
provide. Nonetheless, I do have a partial explanation to give: sometimes it is clear that
a used assumption is not confirmed by the success it leads to because it is so clear that
it did work to generate the success solely in virtue of the fact that it entails some other
proposition which itself is sufficient for the derivational step in question. This is just a
partial explication, of course, but hopefully it is explication enough to have persuasive
force. Another worry is that, far from requiring further explication, it already fails as
it stands because of the use of ‘entailment’ as a key part of the explication.
Entailment seems to work well for the examples given in the previous section:
‘Dave has one of the cold viruses’ is entailed by ‘Dave has the adenovirus’, ‘The
load is too heavy’ is entailed by ‘The load is 50 kg too heavy’, and ‘The electron
can only occupy certain energy states’ is entailed by ‘The electron can only occupy
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certain orbital trajectories’. So why not entailment? Indeed, Vickers (2013, p. 198)
considers precisely the sort of example under consideration here, and talks in terms
of one proposition (the original proposition used within the derivation) ‘containing
within it’ another propositionwhich can take the place of the original proposition in the
derivation. Vickers (ibid.) then writes “By ‘contain within it’, the realist means simply
that some weaker proposition can be inferred from the original proposition: so ‘The
passengers are too heavy’ is contained within ‘The passengers are 50 kg too heavy’.”
However, Vickers’ account leads to some rather awkward results. In particular, it leads
to a disjunction problem.
The basic problem is the Principle of Addition: any given proposition P entails PvQ
for any arbitrary proposition Q. Now, as explained above, to respond to an historical
challenge a realist only needs to show that some individual proposition P does not
merit realist commitment. And Vickers’ analysis seems to suggest that if the realist
can find any proposition entailed by P which can take the place of P in the derivation,
then that shows that P does not merit realist commitment.8 The worry with this is
that P entails PvQ for any Q whatsoever, and so Q can be selected to make sure that
PvQ can take the place of P in the derivation without affecting the derivation of the
prediction in question (call the original prediction ‘A’). Since PvQ is a disjunction one
might worry that any resultant prediction would also be disjunctive, and so couldn’t be
the same as the original prediction, A, achieved by using P. But this isn’t necessarily
the case: if we use PvQ in place of P the final prediction could take the form AvA, and
thus collapse to the original prediction A. This might well be very difficult to achieve
in practice, and also not representative of serious science, or philosophy. But the point
is that Vickers’ analysis allows for this absurd response to an antirealist challenge,
and that is unacceptable. It should be ruled out from the start.
One option here is for Vickers (2013) to retain his analysis but reject the Principle
of Addition, perhaps by adopting a relevance logic. Certainly one could find support
for this move in the literature. Weingartner (1993) notes that “[T]his principle [of
addition] is the culprit of a lot of difficulties in different areas,” and argues that it
is responsible for “most of the well-known paradoxes in the theory of explanation,
confirmation, law statements, disposition predicates, etc.” His conclusion is that we
ought to put limitations on the application of classical logic, especially “if we think of
logical consequences drawn in science from assumptions or hypotheses” (p. 95).More
recently Strevens (2008, Sect. 3.61) encountered his own ‘disjunction problem’ in the
context of developing a causal theory of explanation. And his ingenious attempts to
get around the problem—making reference to ‘causal contiguity at the fundamental
level’—are controversial (see Strevens et al. 2012 for discussion). Perhaps Strevens
too could consider adopting a relevance logic, or (following Weingartner) adopting
classical logic but limiting its application. This will look like an ad hoc solution to
many, but recent work on logical pluralism encourages us to think of logic as a tool,
8 What of derivations consisting of a single assumption entailing another single assumption entailing
another single assumption and so on? Such derivations would pose a problem for my account. In response,
I simply don’t take such ‘derivations’ seriously as a part of real science: real scientific derivations consist of
various different assumptions coming together in a series of complex multi-assumption derivational steps.
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not a truth (cf. Beall and Restall 2006). In which case we need not be bound by every
rule of classical logic in every conceivable context.
I am sympathetic to this line of argument, but in fact it isn’t necessary to mess with
the logic. There is a crucial difference between the (brief) analysis given by Vickers
(2013) and the analysis given here, such that the noted disjunction problem affects
only Vickers (2013). The key to avoiding the problem lies in the particular wording: P
does not merit realist commitment whenever P is doing work in the derivation solely in
virtue of the fact that it entails some other proposition which itself is sufficient, when
combined with the other assumptions in play, for the relevant derivational step. To see
this, suppose that a given P is swapped in the derivation for PvQ, for some random
proposition Q. Certainly it is the case that P entails PvQ, and it might be the case (if
Q is carefully selected) that PvQ itself is sufficient for the relevant derivational step.
But what’s missing here is the condition that P is doing work in the original derivation
in virtue of the fact that it entails PvQ. Remember that Q has been carefully selected
to ensure that the final prediction is unaffected. Most probably, it didn’t feature at all
in the original derivation or indeed the relevant history of science. How, then, could it
make sense to say that the work done by P in the original derivation is work done in
virtue of the fact that P entails PvQ? Entailment of PvQ from P is not enough to meet
this condition: we need something more than mere entailment. One option might be to
turn to entailment which is metaphysically necessary. But to pursue this further would
open up a huge can of worms in metaphysics and logic, e.g. concerning the concept
of a grounding relation (see e.g. Raven 2015). All that matters for present purposes is
that it does notmake sense to say that a given proposition P does work in a derivation
in virtue of the fact that it entails PvQ where Q is selected specifically to leave the
final prediction unaffected and did not feature at all in the relevant history of science.
4 Prospective identification of posits not meriting realist commitment
As argued in Sect. 2, when a specific historical challenge is put forward, the realist
can answer that challenge by arguing that the specific hypotheses in question do not
merit realist commitment (staying silent on what does). Consider again the case of
Bohr’s theory of the atom, and his hypothesis concerning electron orbits. Although
this hypothesis was used by Bohr, the realist can argue that it only did work for Bohr
in virtue of the fact that it entails some other proposition which is itself sufficient,
when combined with the other assumptions in play, for the relevant derivational step
(and thus for the final success). Specifically, Bohr’s derivation of the spectral lines
of ionised helium goes through just the same if we make reference only to electron
energies. Now one may wonder whether this could have been noticed at the time,
or whether we can only reach this conclusion in hindsight. There has been much
fuss of the distinction between prospective and retrospective identification of working
posits. Stanford (2006, pp. 167–180; 2009, pp. 385–387) has argued that we cannot
prospectively identify working posits, and that this is a major blow to realism, since
this is “what the realist caredmost about all along” (2009, p. 387). But even if Stanford
is right (I stay silent on this question) an interesting alternative for the realist is to at
least prospectively narrow down the targets of realist commitment, by identifying at
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least some of the posits which don’t merit realist commitment even though they are
working posits, in the sense noted above. And this is much more feasible, I submit,
simply because it is so much easier to identify something a realist should not commit
to than it is to identify something a realist should commit to.
How would we go about prospectively identifying at least some posits which,
despite being working posits, are not confirmed by the success such that they merit
realist commitment as a consequence of that success? Well, we can simply go through
the assumptions in a derivation one at a time, and consider the following question:
Is this assumption doing work in the derivation solely in virtue of the fact that it
entails some other proposition which is itself sufficient, when combined with the
other assumptions in play, for the success?9 Consider how this could have worked out
in theBohr case. Howmight it have been possible to see that his hypotheses concerning
electron orbits were not confirmed by the success? Well, Bohr’s assumption H con-
cerning quantised electron trajectories entails H∗, which merely concerns quantised
electron energies. Bohr was certainly in a position to notice this entailment relation.
And he was also, of course, in a position to notice that H∗ is sufficient for the success:
H∗ can take the place of H in the derivation without affecting the result. Was Bohr
also in a position to note that H does work in his original derivation solely in virtue
of the fact that it entails H∗? It would seem so, since the fact that H∗ is sufficient for
the result shows that the reference to trajectories is redundant vis-à-vis the success. If
this is right we have the prospective identification of a posit which is not confirmed by
the success it leads to, and this might even lead to a prediction concerning the future
development of the relevant science, namely, reference to the orbital trajectories of
electrons will not be retained in the successor theory. And this prediction of course
would have turned out to be true!
We are perhaps getting ahead of ourselves. Putting ourselves in Bohr’s shoes for a
moment, it may have been inconceivable at the time to think that electrons could have
quantised electron energies without having associated quantised orbital trajectories
(cf. Stanford 2006, p. 171). But this wouldn’t have stopped Bohr noticing that his
references to electron orbits were redundant vis-à-vis his predictive successes. Or, to
put it another way, that his references to electron orbits were not confirmed by the
success. Naturally in such circumstances one might still want to believe in quantised
electron orbits on the grounds that these are, apparently,metaphysically necessitated by
the quantised electron energies and other relevant assumptions. But at least Bohr could
have separated two importantly different motivations for his beliefs: his beliefs in the
quantised energies were motivated directly by their role in generating the successful
predictions, but his beliefs about quantised orbits were motivated by an inference from
his beliefs concerning quantised energies. And, since his beliefs about energies do
9 There is an interesting problem lurking here, which I merely present for future investigation. Suppose
a given derivational step consists of two assumptions A and B combining to deliver C. And suppose that
A entails A* and A* combined with B still delivers C. In that case A does not merit realist commitment.
Suppose further that B entails B*, and B* combined with A still delivers C. In that case, B does not merit
realist commitment. But now suppose that A* and B* together do not deliver C. In that case it seems
that what the realist should not be committed to is underdetermined, since she has equal reason not to be
committed to A and not to be committed to B. And yet not committing to both A and B is not an option
given that A* and B* combined do not deliver C.
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not properly (logically) entail his beliefs concerning orbital trajectories, he could have
come to agree that the latter were not as secure as the former. This gives us a way to
answer Stanford’s question: “[W]hy did we (or the relevant scientific communities)
ever believe more than those parts or aspects of past theories on which their empirical
successes really depended?” (2009, p.385). The answer in Bohr’s case is that the
assumptions apparently responsible for his empirical successes (concerning electron
energies) appeared to conceptually entail other assumptions (concerning electron
orbits). But it still stands that they weren’t directly confirmed by the success, because
they can be seen to be redundant vis-à-vis that success.
This all puts us in a position to be optimistic concerning the prospects for prospec-
tively identifying at least some of the posits which do not merit realist commitment
in our current best scientific theories. One can at least attempt to go through modern-
day derivations of predictions of phenomena, and look for hypotheses which include
details which are redundant for the purposes of the derivation. In this way it may
be possible—at least sometimes—to separate the elements of theory which are con-
firmed by the phenomena they predict, and the elements which are not so-confirmed,
but which we believe for other reasons (e.g. because they appear to be conceptually
or metaphysically entailed by the elements which are confirmed). And when it comes
to the bizarre world of fundamental physics we might come to agree that these other
reasons have been shown time and time again through the history of science not to be
good reasons. Thus the realist should, perhaps, restrict her commitments to what is
directly confirmed by the predictive successes.
At the very least this seems to me to be a worthwhile heuristic to bear in mind when
we (scientists in particular) are thinking about how scientific progress might be made.
Including how general relativity and quantum theory might ultimately be reconciled.
Anything that can help with this extraordinary challenge can only be a good thing.
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